

ing: "\$900,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

WM. L. DAWSON,
JACK BROOKS,
DANTE B. FASCELL,
JOHN B. ANDERSON,
FRANK HORTON,
Managers on the Part of the House.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
CLAIBORNE PELL,
ABE RIBICOFF,
J. R. JAVITS,
JACK MILLER,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4638) to promote the orderly transfer of the Executive power in connection with the expiration of the term of office of a President and the inauguration of a new President, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

Amendment No. 1: This amendment strikes out a sentence in the House bill that provides that not more than 20 per centum of the total expenditures under the Act for any President-elect or Vice-President-elect may be made on the basis of a certificate by him or his assistant that such expenditures are confidential and are in accordance with subsections (a), (b), and (d) of section 3 of the Act. The House recedes with an amendment restoring the stricken sentence but reducing the percentage from 20 per centum to 10 per centum and striking the requirement that these expenditures be confidential and substituting therefor the more stringent requirement that these expenditures be classified and essential to national security.

Amendment No. 2: This amendment reduces the amount authorized to be appropriated annually from \$1,300,000 provided in the House bill to \$500,000. The House recedes with an amendment fixing the authorization at \$900,000.

Amendment No. 3: This amendment provides that the authorization for appropriations be on the basis of each Presidential transition and makes each such appropriation available for expenditure during the fiscal year in which the transition occurs and the next succeeding fiscal year. The House recedes.

WM. L. DAWSON,
JACK BROOKS,
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FRANK HORTON,
Managers on the Part of the House.

PROVIDING FOR AN OFFICIAL PICTURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 552 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Whereas the United States Capitol Historical Society, an educational organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia and counting among its membership some two hundred and fifty founding Members of the Congress of the United States, has as its stated purpose the fostering of an informal understanding of the inspiration and promise of American history with the Capitol edifice itself as the focal point of its program; and

Whereas said society is currently engaged in the compilation and publication of an illustrated historical introduction and guide to the United States Capitol to be made available to the public; and

Whereas said publication will be a complement to and comparable in format to the extraordinary historic guide to the White House recently developed and published by the White House Historical Association; and

Whereas said society in the public interest has pledged to make available for public use negatives of all photographs which it has collected or newly processed for its historic guide; and

Whereas to complete and lend to a book "We the People" which will serve to reflect on the magnificent history of the events which took place in the Capitol Building, said society requests official permission to make for inclusion therein a color photograph of the United States House of Representatives in actual session, which will be used in the book to be published, and for other purposes: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives be lifted at a time designated by the leadership so that the United States Capitol Historical Society be given permission to take some pictures of the House in actual session for inclusion in their publication and for the use of the news services and any and all people who have a legitimate claim to the picture.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, the resolution sets out in detail what it calls for. I have no requests for time. I yield to the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. ST. GEORGE].

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Mr. Speaker, I agree that the resolution sets forth the full purpose of this legislation. I have no requests for time. I know of absolutely no objection to the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

(**Mr. ALBERT** asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to advise the House that the official picture of the House, authorized by the resolution just adopted, will be taken upon the disposition of the conference report on the tax bill on Tuesday next.

ADJOURNMENT FROM FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 21, TO MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, this completes all the legislative business for the week. We do meet tomorrow.

I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns tomorrow it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order under the Calendar Wednesday rule may be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

(**Mr. SCHWENGEL** asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

[**Mr. SCHWENGEL'S** remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

RESOLUTION TO PERMIT PRAYER AND BIBLE READING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

(**Mr. BECKER** asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Speaker, I take this time for one moment to tell the Members of the House that for months and months and months rumors have been going around, and today are still going around more and more, that the Committee on the Judiciary will hold hearings on the subject of prayer in public schools and permission to read the Bible in public schools.

Mr. Speaker, I have been told by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee verbally from time to time that this was going to happen. As far back as May of last year on this floor the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] said he was going to make an announcement in 2 weeks.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we hear these rumors again. Of course, I realize that there is a discharge petition, discharge petition No. 3, on the desk on which there are 145 signatures. I say to the Members of this House if you want to bring this subject to the floor of the House and get it over to the other body, in time for action to be taken at this session, the signing of discharge petition No. 3 is the only route by which we will be able to do it.

Mr. Speaker, I hope the Members of the House will pay some attention to this matter and sign the discharge petition now.

Mr. Speaker, I include with my remarks a copy of a letter which I have recently addressed to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee the gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER].

HON. EMANUEL CELLER,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Because there are so many rumors being circulated as to the possibility of hearings being held on my House Joint Resolution 693, and other resolutions to amend the Constitution to permit prayer and Bible reading in public schools, I would hope an immediate response would be forthcoming from you in order to clear up these rumors.

Some time ago, you told me you were having a study made by your staff on this subject, and that when this study was completed and printed, you would assign this subject to a subcommittee to hold hearings.

I respectfully request that these questions be answered now:

- (1) Has this study been completed?
- (2) Has it been printed?
- (3) Has the subject been assigned to a subcommittee, and who is chairman of the

February 20

3102

subcommittee, and what is the subcommittee?

(4) Has a date been scheduled for hearings to begin; when will these hearings be completed; when can I count on a vote from the Committee on the Judiciary; and when will a report be rendered to the House?

I assure you I intend to keep driving to secure the necessary signatures on Discharge Petition No. 3, for I am convinced that the time is drawing too short in this session in order to complete action early enough for hearings to place this matter before the House for action and to be sent to the Senate early enough for action by that body.

A prompt reply will be greatly appreciated.

FRANK J. BECKER,
Member of Congress.

FRANK M. COFFIN

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, Frank M. Coffin, who for 4 years served as a Member of this House during the 85th and 86th Congresses from the Second District of Maine, has recently been appointed by President Johnson to serve as the U.S. representative to the Development Assistance Committee in Paris.

Frank Coffin, during his two terms in the House, was an energetic, imaginative and conscientious Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a colleague for whom we had affectionate regard.

In resigning the position of Deputy Administrator for the Agency for International Development, a position to which he was appointed by the late President Kennedy and which he has held for nearly 3 years, Frank Coffin is undertaking the difficult assignment of representing the United States in the vital Committee of 12 industrialized nations which are combining their efforts to aid the less-developed countries of the world. The importance of a deep and united commitment by these nations to assist half of the world's population in the less-developed areas is one that particularly concerns the United States. The Development Assistance Committee which is generally known as the DAC, was formed on the initiative of the United States. Our strong and continuing concern in seeing that our industrialized partners increase both the amounts and terms of aid was underscored in President Johnson's appointment of Frank Coffin.

In making the Coffin appointment, the President said:

This appointment reflects the seriousness with which I view the work at DAC. We hope it will make steady progress toward the stimulation of greater and more effective participation of a common aid effort by the industrialized nations of the free world.

As a Member of the House under the Foreign Affairs Committee, Frank Coffin prepared himself well not only for the important responsibilities he has held as Deputy Administrator for AID, but for the new challenge that confronts him in DAC. As a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he first evidenced interest in the free world common aid effort by heading a major study of the Common Market which recom-

mended the establishment of a forum similar to DAC and which would include the United States and Canada.

The DAC was formed in 1961, the year after Frank Coffin left the House. He lead the U.S. delegation to the first annual review and confrontation conducted by DAC in the summer of 1962. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, he and our former colleague Brooks Hays, undertook the first two major congressional studies of Canadian-United States relations and worked toward the development of a permanent Canada-United States Interparliamentary group which is now a well established and effective channel of communications between our Congress and the Canadian Parliament. As Deputy Administrator of AID, he has been an able and articulate advocate of the executive branch in testimony before our committee and other committees of the House.

I am sure that the Members of the House, and particularly the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, join me in wishing Frank Coffin success in this new and challenging position for which he is so exceptionally well qualified.

I would like at this point to insert an editorial printed in the Washington Post of February 18 entitled "Mission in Paris" praising the appointment of Frank Coffin to the Development Assistance Committee.

MISSION IN PARIS

Frank Coffin, the able Maine Democrat, has been appointed to a post of great potential importance in Paris. He will become U.S. representative to the Development Assistance Committee, which has as its task the coordination of European, American and Japanese foreign aid to underdeveloped countries. "Coordination" is a deadly word, but in this case it clearly describes a necessary function. Besides giving multilateral direction to aid, DAC will strive to encourage a growing European participation in assistance to poorer countries.

What is especially gratifying about the appointment is that it has ended Mr. Coffin's prolonged tour in diplomatic limbo. He has been operations director for the AID agency, a thankless chore, and his name had been on President Kennedy's desk last November as Ambassador-designate to Panama. That appointment was never made, and this country was unrepresented in Panama when the canal crisis flared up. It is good that Mr. Coffin has now been assigned a task in which his zeal and dedication can be used to good purpose.

WE CAN AND MUST WIN IN VIETNAM

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter, including articles, editorials, and reports.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, in some circles recently it has been suggested that the United States seek some form of neutralization as a solution for the situation in Vietnam.

The suggestion has come from Hanoi, from France's President de Gaulle, and now even from our own legislative halls.

Such expressions from Americans, it seems to me, do a grave disservice to the brave Vietnamese people who have demonstrated, and are continuing to demon-

strate, their desire to win the present guerrilla conflict against the Communist Vietcong.

Their morale, their feeling of national purpose, is most important to winning this fight. Their morale is the first line of defense.

The effect of statements, from American legislators, whether or not they have the sanction and approval of the administration, are bound to be construed by the Vietnamese as indications that the United States is growing weary of the grueling guerrilla war and want to pull out.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The people of the United States want Communist aggression defeated in Vietnam.

But the Vietnamese may not realize this. They are accustomed to hearing suggestions of neutralization from the North Vietnamese and the French, but not from Americans.

The spirit of these people has been assaulted heavily in recent months. Morale sagged as a result of the political chaos which accompanied the overthrow of the Diem regime and the subsequent ouster of the Minh military junta.

Further, French views on the struggle with the Vietcong have caused discouragement. Vietnamese fear that this attitude may become general throughout the Western alliance, causing withdrawal of U.S. men and assistance.

These latest statements from American statesmen can only indicate to them that their worst fears have been realized, that the United States is, indeed, considering neutralization for South Vietnam.

Besides worrying our Vietnamese allies, these statements give aid and comfort to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

The Vietcong, I am convinced, were losing their war of attrition prior to the assassination of President Diem. Subsequently they rallied and the South Vietnamese suffered setbacks. But these setbacks are no reason to panic.

There is concrete evidence that the regime in Hanoi is meeting with widespread unpopularity among its own people over the war which is draining off resources from an already depressed economy.

The North Vietnamese have other problems. Their harvest last year was at least 20 percent below that of the previous year. They have been unable to rally the Soviet Union to support the war directly. Morale among the Vietcong is a continuing problem.

At this point, Mr. Speaker, I should like to include two recent newspaper articles which spell out some of the difficulties which beset North Vietnam:

[From the Christian Science Monitor,
Feb. 19, 1964]

HANOI BARES WEAKNESSES
(By Robert R. Brunn)

WASHINGTON.—Communist North Vietnam's woes are giving sizable encouragement to the South Vietnamese regime and the United States.

Some kind of a respite is being offered hard-pressed American officials dealing with

1964
the guerrilla war. They argue that now is the time to place aggressive pressure on the Communist forces.

Self-admitted weaknesses of the Hanoi government of North Vietnam, some rather surprising assumptions by the Communists, and U.S. intelligence assessments add up in this way:

Hanoi grimly assumes that the anguish-provoking war will continue, without any question, through 1964 and beyond. This is despite Washington's acknowledgment that the next 4 months are crucial.

Hanoi is combating the widening unpopularity of the war in the south which is draining off resources from a seriously depressed economy. Apathy often characterizes the civilian attitude.

MOSCOW REJECTION

Last year's North Vietnamese harvest was at least 20 percent below 1962's middling harvest. Some starvation is visible but there is no general disaster in sight.

Moscow has flatly turned down a direct Hanoi plea for aid to support the war. The North Vietnamese reason that they can't afford to turn their backs politically on Peiping, and that Peiping's gasping economy can give them little help in terms of food or weapons.

Morale among the Communist Vietcong troops in the guerrilla war is a continuing problem for the North Vietnamese Government. Analysts have seen absolutely no evidence that the division between pro-Peiping and pro-Moscow camps seriously hampers the war effort, as such. The major Hanoi decision to side openly with Peiping was bound to leave a disappointed minority but there have been no demotions, no dissident voices raised.

Hanoi has a healthy, decisive respect for U.S. military power and sees the superior weapons, equipment, and manpower of the South Vietnamese are still a major obstacle to victory. The Communists fear an escalation of the war bringing an open U.S. invasion of North Vietnam and this has tended up to now to keep the Communist military effort within a limited framework.

While the Vietcong at times has its guerrillas at battalion strength, they are in no position to coordinate such units in massive movements against the South Vietnamese. One factor is the lack of well-anchored supply bases for such operations.

Neutralization of North Vietnam is considered to be utterly out of the question in the minds of the Hanoi regime.

Much of the above analysis comes out of a careful American study of the most important statement made by the Hanoi government in several years.

PROTRACTED TRIALS

It was spelled out in two articles in the January and February issues in Hanoi's principal journal Hoc Tan, and a third article in the newspaper Nhan Dan.

This official line laid down by the articles in Hoc Tan is designed to seep down through the ranks of the faithful and be imported to South Vietnam and discussed by the fighting guerrillas, observers here believe.

When the articles speak of "new, hard, long protracted trials" in the war and use the word "protracted" over and over again, the signal is that the Hanoi Communists are not thinking in terms of a rapid termination of the war or the imminent defeat of the South Vietnamese Army.

On the contrary, the Communists expect a mounting military initiative in South Vietnam and complain that often they will have to meet modern weapons with rusty nails and crossbows.

ECONOMIC DRAIN

Analysts emphasize there is no widespread disaffection in North Vietnam. The farm situation is grim but not beyond hope.

But there is little doubt there is a solid body of opinion in the north that the never ending war is the primary cause for the weakness of their economy.

The war in South Vietnam is seen here as basically an indigenous one, gaining its support from within Vietnam. It is a "dirty" war, and one which has its grim aspects for the Communists who have had no spectacular victories. These magazine articles were designed to buck up the morale of the fighting men.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1964]
HANOI APPEARS WORRIED OVER WAR'S PROGRESS
(By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)

From Hanoi last week came signs that the grueling war in South Vietnam is as uncertain and troubling to Communist North Vietnam as to the United States.

This message of doubt and difficulty was extracted by Washington from what was described as the most important statement of North Vietnamese policy in the last few years.

On one side, the Hanoi Communists warned that China would defend them if the United States—in order to win in South Vietnam—invaded or attacked the north. The terms of the warning, however, clouded the question of how much Soviet or nuclear help Hanoi might get.

NEUTRALIZATION REJECTED

On the other side, North Vietnam rejected suggestions for its own neutralization, as distinct from the neutralization of the South. But in so doing it raised doubts about the Communists' heart for continued combat.

In place of both "escalation" and neutralization as desirable or likely turns, Hanoi laid out a policy embracing the Chinese line of continued struggle against "imperialism" and abandoning the Soviet line of accommodation.

But in facing up to "new, hard, long and protracted trials" against the U.S.-supported Government of South Vietnam, Hanoi avoided deadlines, timetables and any other assurances except open-ended prophecies of "final victory."

These policy developments came in major articles in the January and February numbers of Hanoi's chief journal Hoc Tan, and in a short article in the chief newspaper, Nhan Dan.

The January number had been suppressed in Hanoi until last Tuesday, when both it and the February issue were publicized. The newspaper article was distributed next day.

MOSCOW COOL

The occasion was the failure of a North Vietnamese mission to Moscow to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. This result of the trip was suggested by the frosty and fading treatment given the mission by the Soviet press. Departing Moscow, the delegation stopped off in Peiping early last week and arrived back in Hanoi yesterday.

To Washington, the journal articles had the appearance of position papers prepared for the confrontation in Moscow, while the brief newspaper story was an updating required by events.

The delegation's doings, the publication schedule of the three articles and their content—all indicated that the North Vietnamese regime of Ho Chi Minh finally has fallen off its neutral perch in the Sino-Soviet dispute and now is on the side of Peiping.

The delayed January article quoted Soviet Premier Khrushchev critically without naming him. It declared: "All arguments and actions for 'all-round cooperation' with U.S. imperialism and all hopes to prevent war and uphold world peace through consultation and cooperation with the United States are illusions."

"The people in the south should not pin their hope on the 'sincere desire for peace'

of the U.S. aggressor, nor should they wait for 15 or 20 more years for the defeat of the imperialist camp in economic competition."

Said Hanoi: "The only way to achieve peace is to fight against imperialism."

The February article dealt in practical terms with the conduct of the war. It spoke confidently of the advantages conferred on the Communist guerrillas by their tactics and morale—calling morale the "main decisive factor" in a number of their conspicuous victories.

LOW ON WEAPONS

Morale is more important than weapons and physical means to those who lack the latter, observers here noted. They pointed out the article's stress on the fashioning of rudimentary weapons such as rusty nails and the capture of enemy weapons by the guerrillas. This suggested, too, no change in the low level of physical Chinese support of the war, and therefore no prospect of quick success.

In a key section, Hanoi said that "the U.S. imperialists can only choose one of the following three courses:"

1. To withdraw. But only by heavier and heavier defeats will this result.
2. To "introduce hundreds of thousands of more troops and large quantities of arms, and apply new techniques to carry on the war for some years."

WORLD OPINION CITED

Arguing against this course, Hanoi cited world opinion and past events in Laos, Algeria, and Vietnam. "As for the eventual use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States," it said, the closeness and irregularity of the front lines make this unlikely. It added obliquely: "It is difficult for the U.S. imperialists to estimate beforehand all the consequences."

3. To broaden the war and invade North Vietnam it an attempt to win victory in South Vietnam. Then, threatened Hanoi, the United States "would have to cope not only with North Vietnam, but also with China or eventually with the socialist camp as a whole."

The phrase "or eventually" was taken here as a purposefully vague reference to Soviet support. The same vagueness was seen in the statement that, if the United States used nuclear weapons, "that might directly lead to retaliation with the same weapons."

MORALE A WORRY

The Nhan Dan newspaper article took up neutralization. The French have proposed such a course for South Vietnam but President Johnson has said it must apply to both north and south to be worth considering.

"Why did Johnson raise the question of neutralizing both zones of Vietnam, although he knows too well that our people will never accept the neutralization of North Vietnam?" asked Nhan Dan. It answered: "To soothe the tendencies" for peace and neutrality in South Vietnam.

Analysts, noting the possible harmful effects on military morale of talk about neutralization, said this statement was a way to reject the French proposal without spoiling relations with French President de Gaulle.

This statement was one of many which led analysts here to suspect that Hanoi is worrying about the morale of the forces it supports in the south.

Both these articles, it should be pointed out, emphasize that the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists do not see any resolution to the war in South Vietnam in the near future.

Neither, I might add, should the United States. There is not going to be a quick military victory. Even with increased

U.S. help to a politically stable South Vietnam, it might be a decade or more until the Vietcong resistance is broken.

U.S. aid and combat training teams are going to be needed in Vietnam for quite some time to come. We are going to need much perseverance.

One alternative, of course, is neutralization of the two Vietnams. This course would ultimately, I am convinced, result in complete Communist dominance in the whole of the Indochina Peninsula.

For Red China is not going to be content to be buffered by neutral states. She is going to want—and need—satellites, as the Soviet Union wanted, and obtained, satellites.

As the late President Kennedy said in an important foreign policy speech last September:

China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in southeast Asia was China and the Communists.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot let that happen. We cannot give way—or appear to give way before the expansionist policies of Communist China. Instead, we must make our stand in Vietnam, as long as the freedom-loving people of that nation ask our assistance in this joint endeavor against communism.

The question has been asked whether we, in terms of the American lives and resources expended, prefer what exists in South Vietnam to what we see in Laos and Cambodia.

To that I answer a resounding, yes.

In South Vietnam we see a brave and proud people battling to keep their nation free in the face of brutal attacks by Communist guerrillas.

In Laos in recent days we have seen the Communist Pathet Lao forces win more territory against the neutralist and rightist forces which are slowly, but surely, being backed to the wall. In Laos we see a sham of neutralization where each day the Communist forces commit another violation of the Geneva accords.

Some observers have all but written off Laos to the Communists.

In Cambodia we have seen a steady drift toward Peiping. Yesterday, for example, the press carried a report that Prince Sihanouk would seriously consider alining his country with Communist China and North Vietnam.

I would rather see a fight being mounted against Communist aggression than stand by while country after country, like a string of dominoes, goes down before the Communist advance.

My belief is that the American people who have three times in this century mounted major campaigns to defeat totalitarianism, will not flinch before this challenge.

Certainly we do not welcome the expenditures in men and resources which might be demanded of us in continuing our presence in South Vietnam. Every dollar spent could, no doubt, be put to good use here in our own country. Every American boy killed will leave hearts

stricken with grief. We do not make these sacrifices lightly; we make them in the knowledge that if we fail to remain firm in Vietnam, then southeast Asia may be lost to the free world.

Let us not minimize the extent of our country's commitment in Vietnam. Let us not delude ourselves about how much is at stake in that beleaguered country.

True, this is a war that the Vietnamese must fight and try to win themselves. But they cannot do it alone. With the resources of the Communists thrown on the other side, the scales are weighted against them. Our Nation, as the leader of the free world, must help tip the balance on the side of freedom.

It has been questioned whether the war in Vietnam is in our national interest. That same question could, I suppose, be asked about Korea and Berlin.

As in those situations, the answer can only be affirmative. A firm stand in South Vietnam is in our national and international interests.

While we do not wish additional commitments of men and equipment in South Vietnam, let us not hesitate to provide them should it become necessary.

While we do not wish to involve U.S. troops in direct fighting in South Vietnam, let us not shrink from such involvement should it become necessary.

While we do not desire to fight a Korea-type war in South Vietnam, let us not rule out the possibility. By remaining firm in Vietnam, we prevent such a probability.

Mr. Speaker, the forces of light struggle against the forces of darkness in southeast Asia. This battleground has seen some victories for free world forces, some defeats. The war itself still hangs in the balance; its outcome is by no means certain.

Seen in that light, Vietnam becomes more than just a country of 15 million people. It is a symbol of American intentions and a test of our perseverance.

As chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific and an American citizen, I do not want history to record that because of the narrowly construed opinion of what is in our national interest, the United States failed to stand in Vietnam, and found that such a course led it to further withdrawals and ultimate decline.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of my colleagues an article by Mr. Hanson Baldwin which appeared in the New York Times on Sunday, February 16, 1964. I am also including an article from the Christian Science Monitor by Joseph C. Harsch which emphasizes that patience and tenacity may yet pay off for the United States in Vietnam:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 16, 1964]
THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM—IS VICTORY FOR THE WEST POSSIBLE?—MUCH DEPENDS ON STABILITY IN SAIGON AND NEW LEADERSHIP FOR THE ARMED FORCES—THE MILITARY SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED AND THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME IS IN DOUBT

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

South Vietnam's moment of truth appears to be at hand. The 4-month dry season, when counter guerrilla operations are easier, has started but against a dismal military and political background.

Another military coup d'état in Saigon has shaken both South Vietnam and Washington. The French recognition of Communist China and Communist or neutralist gains in bordering Laos and Cambodia have made the position of a strong anti-Communist South Vietnamese Government far more difficult.

The Vietcong, the Communist-led guerrillas, have increased the tempo of their attacks and clearly have the initiative in the important Mekong Delta region and in some other areas of the country. And last week the Communists opened a new campaign of terrorism against the 16,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel in South Vietnam and brought the war of stealth and assassination, of ambush and subversion, to the homes and playgrounds of Americans in Saigon.

President Johnson said that "we are not pulling out of southeast Asia, because we are not willing to yield that part of the world to . . . communism."

Nevertheless, more and more people in Washington and abroad were asking: Is victory possible in South Vietnam?

I. MILITARY PICTURE

There is no doubt that, from the point of view of Washington and the anti-Communist leaders of South Vietnam, the military situation has deteriorated in the last 10 months.

Part of the deterioration is more apparent than real. Washington, and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor in particular, has become aware since the overthrow of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem last November, that they had accepted too much at face value the exaggerated reports of "successes" of the South Vietnamese Government and of some top U.S. military sources in Saigon.

However, if the Vietnamese war was not going as well as Washington said it was, there certainly had been considerable improvement since the dark days of 2½ years ago, when the United States began its big buildup of effort and aid. With U.S. aid, the South Vietnamese were better trained, better organized, and better equipped, and in some areas they had cleared out the Vietcong guerrillas and undertook the slow and grueling business of wearing down the enemy.

Early last year, though the war was never over the hump, it could be said, with fair certainty, that the tide of defeat had been dammed and that it was the end of the beginning.

But a spring, summer, and fall of political instability and military deterioration have now culminated in a second military coup and the resumption by the Vietcong of extensive aggressive and successful operations. The Communists hold the initiative in much of the country, and the ultimate outcome is in doubt.

The statistics of this "war in the shadows" can be misleading, but they provide some index to the present situation. Our 1962 estimate of 15,000 to 20,000 hard core Vietcong regulars has now increased to about 25,000 and 30,000 to 35,000 may actually be a more accurate total. The increase, despite South Vietnamese claims of inflicting about 80,000 casualties on the Vietcong in each of the last 2 years, is attributable to several factors:

- (1) Exaggerated casualty claims by Saigon.
- (2) Defections, including some from the South Vietnamese Army, and extensive recruitment in South Vietnam by the Vietcong.
- (3) Infiltration into South Vietnam during the last 3 years from North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and elsewhere of about 21,000—perhaps more—tough highly trained Communists.

The Vietcong regulars are considerably better equipped than they were 2 years ago, as increased hits upon U.S. helicopters demonstrate. They employ many more machine-guns, mortars and recoilless rifles, and more

196

automatic and semiautomatic small arms, either made in China, or imported through China from the Soviet bloc. But by far the greater part of their armory is indigenous; it has been captured from South Vietnamese troops or manufactured in crude but effective form, in South Vietnam itself. The ratio of weapons captured to weapons lost still considerably favors the Vietcong, as to a lesser extent, do recent casualty estimates.

GUERRILLA STRENGTH

In addition to the Vietcong regulars, there are estimated to be 100,000 to 125,000 active supporters or part-time guerrillas, a number which appears to be increasing, plus an undetermined number, hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of civilians whose active sympathies or enforced cooperation aid the Communists—the “sea” in which the guerrilla “fish” swim.

The South Vietnamese Government's forces total about 380,000—about 200,000 of them regulars, the rest in the civil guard, self-defense corps, and other paramilitary organizations.

The Government can claim some areas. Saigon and its immediate vicinity, though not immune to Communist terrorism, is firmly held. The central coastal area is, on the whole, under fairly firm Government control. The rugged, mountainous central highlands area, home of the primitive montagnards, is less certain, but U.S. special forces teams have made considerable progress, and the area, though by no means completely pacified, is not the free and open sanctuary for the Vietcong it once was.

The delta region, which is the great rice producing area and the heart of the country, is the vital battleground, and here the dry season opens with the Government forces eagerly on the defensive and with much of the area controlled—not only by night but also by day—by the Vietcong. Nevertheless, in 1963 the Government exported surplus rice; in 1962 it was forced to import rice.

II. AREA'S IMPORTANCE

South Vietnam has major strategic, political, psychological and economic importance in southeast Asia and to the United States global image.

Perhaps most important to Washington, in any long-term assessment of the consequences of a defeat there, is the fact that the United States has been fully committed to victory. Both President Kennedy and his brother promised a fight to the finish against communism. If this finish should not be successful, or if the United States should renege on its promise, the “paper tiger” image of the United States so sedulously cultivated by Peiping, particularly after the Korean war and the French-American defeat in Indochina, would become a powerful psychological liability for Washington's policies in the Orient.

The encroachments of communism and neutralism in the threat of Chinese armies to India have already shaken Thailand. A victory by the Communists in South Vietnam would probably mean communism's eventual conquest by bloodless coup or by creeping aggression, of most of the rest of the southeast Asian peninsula and would pose a threat to Malaya and the important Singapore Strait.

SEVERE DEFEAT

No matter how viewed the loss of South Vietnam would mean a severe moral, political and psychological defeat for the United States in the Orient, and also a blow to our military image since the policies and the tactics employed there were worked out and backed to the full by Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and other military officials.

South Vietnam also has a considerable economic importance as a rice bowl and would be a welcome prize both to the Communist-controlled industrial northern part of the country and to overpopulated China.

III. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

Additional military equipment (except for replacements and a few new specialized items peculiarly suited to the climate, terrain, and nature of the war) is emphatically not a requirement. The South Vietnamese Army is more lavishly equipped with modern weapons and equipment, and has, thanks to U.S.-operated helicopters and U.S. support, more tactical mobility and better air support than any other army in southeast Asia.

There is less agreement whether South Vietnam has enough men under arms to do the job. Most observers believe there is no requirement for an increase in numbers; the problem is to improve the combat capability of those already in uniform. But any discussion of quantitative or qualitative manpower requirements sooner or later brings up the question of whether it is necessary for the United States to intervene in South Vietnam with combat units in addition to the advisory and support forces there now. Most observers do not feel that such an involvement is essential to victory if—and the if is a big condition—other requirements are met.

What is needed, it is generally agreed, are new policies, new leaders, new tactics, and new intangibles—and it is the last named that will make all the difference between men in uniform with rifles in their hands and an army.

The new policies should aim at reducing the amount of supplies and the numbers of trained Communists flowing to the Vietcong across, South Vietnam's borders. This is a difficult but not impossible task.

AGGRESSIVE MOVES

Aggressive attempts to seal off South Vietnam's frontiers, aided by political efforts in Cambodia and Laos, and to project a South Vietnamese guerrilla effort into North Vietnam, would probably more than repay their costs. The establishment of anti-Communist guerrilla forces of any consequence in North Vietnam would be exceedingly difficult (less so in Laos) but not impossible. So far, the small and experimental efforts made have been doomed by overcaution and all sorts of caveats from Washington.

Direct and open attack, by bombing or other means, against the North Vietnamese privileged sanctuary appears to have little support chiefly because such assaults would escalate or greatly broaden the war, without compensating military results. The bombing of North Vietnam could not halt the flow of supplies to the Vietcong, particularly since most of their weapons are captured from the South Vietnamese Army.

New leadership—aggressive, tough, imaginative and with the will to fight—is essential to any prescription for victory. It is needed at many levels, particularly in the higher levels of the South Vietnamese Army. Washington has made a contribution of its own to this end by sending Lieut. Gen. W. C. Westmoreland as a deputy and apparent understudy for Gen. Paul D. Harkins, who may retire soon. At the same time, the command of the Pacific Ocean area, under which Vietnam comes, will change this spring, and there may be changes in the high command in the Pentagon.

NEW LEADERSHIP

The new leadership is needed most in the Vietnamese Army, particularly in Lieutenant colonels, colonels, and division and corps commands.

Only the new leadership can foster the new tactics—or rather the old time-tested tactics that are essential for victory in any war of counterinsurgency.

Aggressive patrolling is their keynote; it has usually been conspicuous by its absence in the past. The tactics must be keyed to mobility—not only to helicopter mobility, but to shanks mare mobility, to denying the Vietcong the sanctuary of the night

hours and of large tracts of jungle and swampy terrain. The mobile tactics must emphasize continuous, aggressive patrolling day and night, the utilization of ambush, the unceasing harrying of all known guerrilla units, the seizure of the initiative from the enemy, the elimination of as many static posts as possible and a definite transfer of the main emphasis to mobile warfare, utilizing the helicopter for transport where advisable, but using it also to supply jungle patrols.

The new leadership and the new tactics, which are indispensable to victory, mean also the most important of the new intangibles: a growth of the will to fight, a desire to defeat the Communists, on the part of the Vietnamese regulars and their paramilitary support forces.

IV. POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS

The most important of the political requirements for victory, and perhaps the most difficult to achieve, is Vietnamese political stability. South Vietnam, never a nation in the Western sense, but more a loose amalgam of village, tribal, and factional loyalties and rivalries, has experienced two coups in a few months. The army, the only national “cement” in the social structure, has been involved in both and it is evident there are many factions and much politics in the army. If another coup occurs, the army might well degenerate into many power-seeking factions each more intent on its own elevation than on national preservation. For South Vietnam today, threatened by a powerful internal enemy heavily supported from without, it is quite clear that two coups are enough. Political and hence military stability are essential to victory.

WAR OF ATTRITION

A major requirement for winning any long-drawn-out war of attrition is public support; both the Vietnamese Government's and the U.S. Government's restrictive and misleading public-relations policies have contributed greatly to a declining lack of support, which could be fatal. And Washington, with its tremendous bureaucracy, has sometimes hampered rather than helped those trying to win the war in Vietnam. Differences in Washington have been reflected in the American team in Saigon, on the one hand; on the other, there has been overcontrol from Washington.

Political and psychological efforts to deny the Communist fish the support of the population sea in which they swim must also be accelerated. These require a combination of military, psychological, social-economic, and civic-action activities. The fortified hamlet program plays an important role in this process, for the civilian has to be offered some security against Communist duress. But the hamlet program is of little use when established in areas normally controlled by strong Communist forces, which can, at leisure, overrun any desired hamlet. It is far more important, however, when Vietcong units are broken up and harried; then the peasant can find real security in collective measures.

The political recipe for victory should also include diplomatic measures to strengthen the anti-Communist position in Laos and truly to neutralize Cambodia.

V. THE STAKES

There is no doubt that the stakes are high in Vietnam. They are considerably more important than the economic, political, and strategic value of the country. For in Vietnam the United States has fielded, for the first time, its concept of counterinsurgency and has made its first all-out attempt to erect a defense against Communism's creeping aggressions and Premier Khrushchev's tactics of national wars of liberation. If the defense fails, if the dam breaks, there will be no clear-cut line drawn against Com-

munist expansion in Southeast Asia or anywhere else in the world. A new victory for communism would have most serious international and domestic consequences.

Because the United States has been morally, militarily, and politically committed in South Vietnam, because its prestige is involved and because the consequences of failure would have worldwide repercussions, most, but not all, Washington officials believe the price of victory must be paid even if the price includes some limited commitment of U.S. combat forces.

VI. THE FUTURE

The intangibles of the Vietnamese situation make nice power equations illogical and forecasts impossible. The military situation has deteriorated; in some areas it is bleak, indeed. But it is by no means hopeless—if. The greatest imponderable is the stability and ability of the South Vietnamese Government. If it falls—as it may if there is another coup, as there may be—the achievement of military victory may become politically and psychologically impossible and there will be increasing demands for a political solution, that is, some form of neutralization. From Washington's point of view this could only mean delayed defeat, for neutralization would almost certainly mean an eventual Communist takeover.

DISTANT VICTORY

On the other hand, if the South Vietnamese Government is stable and the requirements of victory are met, there will be much more blood, sweat, and tears before any definitive results become apparent. For wars of attrition, and particularly counter-guerrilla operations, are slow and wasting. Results, or the lack of them, must be measured against the yardstick of months and years, not days.

Thus, the great problem in South Vietnam today is that defeat, even though masked in terms of a "political settlement," could come quickly, whereas victory, no matter what is done, is far away.

[From Christian Science Monitor,
Feb. 14, 1964]

THE RIFT IN THE VIETNAM CLOUDS (By Joseph C. Harsch)

LONDON.—Patience and tenacity may yet pay off for Washington over Vietnam.

The current general assumption is that the American position there is suspended helplessly and hopelessly between the danger of disengagement and the impossibility of winning a military victory.

But as so often happens in power politics there is now a tiny ray of light through the gloom from unexpected quarters. There is interesting evidence that the Communist Party in North Vietnam is now badly split between the Peiping and Moscow factions, even to the point of resistance to continuation of the war from within the Communist leadership.

First hints of possible trouble within the Communist ranks date from last October. Appeals for unity within the party became so insistent and persistent as to suggest a possibility that perhaps unity was less than perfect.

Since then a top party delegation has been suddenly and without advance warning sent off first to Peiping and then to Moscow. The circumstances suggest that this constitutes an urgent effort to persuade Moscow and Peiping to reconcile their differences on the ground that without such reconciliation the party in North Vietnam will be dangerously divided.

Reasons for an opposition group to form in Vietnam arise out of the fact that Moscow has cut down its aid to the North Vietnam Communists since President Ho Chi Minh refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty

and thus aligned himself with Peiping in the big internal division in the Communist world.

Apparently Peiping is unable to make up for the decline in Soviet aid, thus leaving North Vietnam with a declining economy and the continuing drain of the war.

Seen from the Western side of the fence, the Communists sometimes seem to enjoy unlimited resources and energy, but, of course, this is not always the case.

We know now that the Korean war put a severe strain on the economies of all the European Communist countries. In fact, an interesting case can be made that the dislocations caused by that war were actually at the root of all the troubles Moscow has since had with its satellites.

The struggle in Vietnam has seemed to Westerners to be frustrating. There has never yet been a native Vietnamese government which could earn and hold the confidence of the people. The guerrilla tactics used by Communists in the rice paddies of the Mekong River Delta have not yet yielded to any military formula the West has ever been able to devise.

Many a Western statesman has examined and reexamined the problem and come to the conclusion that it was one of those monstrous cases where there seemed no end ever in sight—nothing but the continued frustration of being unable either to conclude or get out.

But as so often happens in war the moment comes when the side so conscious of its own difficulties and weaknesses discovers that the opponent has his weaknesses as well.

The implication would appear to be clear that this is no time to talk or think of disengaging or calling off the military effort. On the contrary, it should be maintained as vigorously as possible because relaxing now could save the hard-line Communists by the one sure means. All Vietnam would fall to them while the Peiping extremist faction is still in control.

At the same time, exploration of the possibility of neutralization of the entire country should go on and could eventually be the solution—at such time as the Moscow faction came out on top.

Moscow-style communism would serve the West better in the Far East, just as Peiping style communism was an improvement for the West when it broke out in Albania and thus broke up Moscow's European empire.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate myself with the remarks made by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ZABLOCKI]. I congratulate the gentleman on his statement. As ranking member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, I think the gentleman's statement has particular significance. I happen to know that the gentleman has spent a great deal of time studying this very serious problem in Vietnam. He has visited that war-torn country to obtain firsthand information. There can be no question that for the world to turn its back now on those who continue to struggle for freedom in Vietnam would be to set back the cause of freedom throughout the world.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I thank the gentleman.

CONGRESSMAN HORTON

(Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia (at the request of Mr. HALLECK) was granted

permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to pay tribute today to our colleague, the gentleman from New York, Congressman HORTON, for the service he has and is rendering this great Nation. Courageous service in an honorable cause is a supreme achievement in human life. Having served here with FRANK, my admiration for his dedication and devotion to principle has grown with our association.

It is no surprise that he has given service to his country in time of war. Certainly, he possesses the personal qualities that makes possible an unselfish choice when the battlefield was before him.

He still possesses those qualities, and now is prepared to use them in this Chamber. Indeed, his short record in Congress has already marked him as a legislator of great ability and understanding. His dedication to his principles has shown him to be a leader of great promise. He has been diligent in the unswerving service he has given to the fine district in the State of New York that he has the honor to represent here.

I am honored to join with my colleagues in expressing to the gentleman from New York, FRANK HORTON, my gratitude for the courageous service he has rendered on the field of battle and to express my confidence that his achievements as a lawmaker and statesman will be no less meritorious.

PANAMA SITUATION

(Mr. KEITH (at the request of Mr. HALLECK) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, the problems confronting the United States in Panama remain unsolved. The situation is serious and it should receive serious attention. Among the questions which we should pose is "To what extent is this Communist inspired?" The evidence is now beginning to confirm suspicions of Communist involvement in the Panama flareup. We should take a long hard look at the facts and in this connection, I refer the following article from the Chicago Tribune of February 1, 1964, to the attention of my colleagues.

[From the Chicago Tribune, Feb. 1, 1964]
IDENTIFY REDS IN CANAL RIOT—40 AGITATORS ARMED; MOST VISITED CUBA—TOOK ADVANTAGE OF FLAG INCIDENT

NEW YORK, January 31.—Communists and Fidelistas (Castroites) helped organize and develop the anti-American riots in Panama in which 21 persons were killed and several hundred injured, authoritative sources told United Press International here today.

The sources supplied photographs and identifications of participants. They included 70 known Communists and fellow travelers, 40 of whom were armed and played leading roles.

Most were said to have been recent visitors to Cuba, Communist China or the Soviet Union.

ARREST SOME RADICALS

Despite Panamanian denials, the sources said Panama authorities arrested some of